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Abstract I/O Specification
WILLEM PENNINCKX, AMIN TIMANY, and BART JACOBS, KU Leuven, Belgium
Penninckx et al. recently proposed an approach for the specification and modular formal verification of the
interactive (I/O) behavior of programs, based on an embedding of Petri nets into separation logic. While this
approach is scalable and modular in terms of the I/O APIs available to a program, enables composing low-
level I/O actions into high-level ones, and enables a convenient verification experience, it does not support
high-level I/O actions that involve memory manipulation as well as low-level I/O (such as buffered I/O), or
that are in fact “virtual I/O” actions that are implemented purely through memory manipulation (such as
offered by Java’s ByteArrayOutputStream). Furthermore, it does not allow rewriting an I/O specification into
an equivalent one.
In this paper, we propose a refined approach that does have these properties. The essential insight is to
fix the set of places of the Petri net to be the set of separation logic assertions, thus making available the
full power of separation logic for abstractly stating an arbitrary operation’s specification in Petri net form,
for composing operations into an I/O specification, and for equivalence reasoning on I/O specifications. Our
refinement resolves the issue of the justification of the choice of Petri nets over other formalisms such as
general state transition systems, in that it “refines them away” into themore essential constructs of separating
conjunction and abstract nested triples. To enable a convenient treatment of input operations, we propose the
use of prophecy variables to eliminate their non-determinism.
We illustrate the approach through a number of example programs, including one where subroutines spec-
ified and verified using I/O specifications run as threads communicating through shared memory. The theory
and examples of the paper have been machine-checked using the Iris library for program verification in the
Coq proof assistant.
1 INTRODUCTION
While great progress has been made in recent decades on approaches for modular formal verifica-
tion of memory safety of imperative programs, as well as functional correctness of data structures
and algorithms, even in the presence of pointer manipulation (or other types of aliasing), coarse-
grained or fine-grained concurrency, and higher-order programming, the issue of specifying and
modularly verifying the actual observable interactive behavior of the program as a whole, such as
achieved through I/O APIs including file I/O, network I/O, graphical user interface APIs, etc., has
received much less attention; verification of interactive behavior, if done at all, has mostly been
performed at the level of abstract models, often using techniques such as model checking, rather
than at the level of source code, integrated with the Hoare logic used for verifying memory safety
and data structure correctness. This leaves an unverified gap between the abstract models and the
source code.
In this paper, we address this issue by proposing an approach for integrating I/O verification
into a Hoare-style modular program verification approach where each function of the program is
assigned a specification consisting of a precondition and a postcondition, and then each function is
verified against its specification, under the assumption that its callees satisfy theirs. This involves
in particular addressing the question of what the specifications of the platform’s I/O API functions,
and the program’s main function, should look like, to express the program’s behavioral require-
ments. Our goal is that the approach should be applicable to an annotation-based verification tool,
such as e.g. the VeriFast tool, for programs written in real languages, such as C or Java, against
real platform APIs, such as stdio.h or java.io.
Authors’ address: Willem Penninckx, willem@willemp.be; Amin Timany, amin.timany@cs.kuleuven.be; Bart Jacobs, bart.
jacobs@cs.kuleuven.be, Department of Computer Science, KU Leuven, Celestijnenlaan 200A, Leuven, 3001, Belgium.
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As far as we know, the only approach that has been proposed so far to address this goal is the one
proposed by Penninckx et al. [2015], where a program’s behavioral requirements are expressed
as Petri nets embedded into separation logic [O’Hearn et al. 2001]. This approach scales and is
modular with respect to the number of I/O APIs available to a program, it allows the program (or
program libraries) to define higher-level I/O actions on top of the platform I/O actions (such that a
programmodule can be agnostic as to which actions are primitive and which are composite), and it
integrates well into existing separation logic tool support approaches such as symbolic execution
with symbolic heaps, yielding a convenient, low-overhead verification experience. However, this
approach does not support high-level I/O actions that involve memorymanipulation aswell as low-
level I/O (such as buffered I/O), or that are in fact “virtual I/O” actions that are implemented purely
through memory manipulation (such as offered by Java’s ByteArrayOutputStream). Furthermore,
it does not allow rewriting an I/O specification into an equivalent one.
In this paper, we propose a refined approach that does have these properties. The essential in-
sight is to fix the set of places of the Petri net to be the set of separation logic assertions, thus
making available the full power of separation logic for abstractly stating an arbitrary operation’s
specification in Petri net form, for composing operations into an I/O specification, and for equiva-
lence reasoning on I/O specifications. To enable a convenient treatment of non-deterministic input
operations, we propose the use of prophecy variables to eliminate the non-determinism.
Our proposed refinement resolves the issue of the justification of the choice of Petri nets over
other formalisms, such as general state transition systems, in that while the refined approach can
still be seen as applying the Petri nets formalism, it can also be explained straightforwardly without
any reference to Petri nets, as simply applying the essential concepts of separating conjunction and
an abstract form of nested Hoare triples (e.g. [Krebbers et al. 2017; Schwinghammer et al. 2011]).
We illustrate the approach through a number of example programs, including one where sub-
routines specified and verified using I/O specifications run as threads communicating through
shared memory. The theory and examples of the paper have been machine-checked using the Iris
[Krebbers et al. 2017] library for verification of concurrent programs in the Coq proof assistant.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In §2, we define the syntax and the semantics of the
programming language thatwewill use to present our approach. In §3, we recall the Petri net-based
specification approach [Penninckx et al. 2015] that we refine in this work. In §4, we introduce
our refined approach, and we motivate it by means of the example of buffered output. In §5, we
illustrate the problem of proving I/O-style specifications for in-memory input operations bymeans
of a chat server example. In §6 we introduce prophecy variables to address this problem. In §7 we
extend our programming languge from §2 and our Hoare logic from §3 to support concurrency,
which we then use in §8 to verify an implementation of the channels construct used in the chat
server against I/O-style specifications. We end the paper with a discussion of related work (§9) and
a conclusion (§10).
2 A PROGRAMMING LANGUAGEWITH I/O
2.1 The Programming Language
We present the basic idea of our approach in the context of a simple ML-like programming lan-
guage with support for I/O. Its grammar is as follows:
x ∈ Vars, t ∈ IOTags
e ∈ Exprs ::= () | inl(e) | inr(e) | (e, e) | λx . e | x
| cases(e, e, e) | fst(e) | snd(e) | e(e) | assert(e)
| ref(e) | !e | e ← e | t(e)
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h, cases(inl(v), λx . e, _)
ϵ
֒→ h, e[v/x] h, cases(inr(v), _, λx . e)
ϵ
֒→ h, e[v/x]
h, fst((v,v ′))
ϵ
֒→ h,v h, snd((v,v ′))
ϵ
֒→ h,v ′ h, (λx . e)(v)
ϵ
֒→ h, e[v/x]
h, assert(true)
ϵ
֒→ h, ()
ℓ < dom(h)
h, ref(v)
ϵ
֒→ h[ℓ := v], ℓ
ℓ ∈ dom(h)
h, !ℓ
ϵ
֒→ h,h(ℓ)
ℓ ∈ dom(h)
h, ℓ ← v
ϵ
֒→ h[ℓ := v], ()
h, t(v)
t (v,v ′)
֒→ h,v ′
h, e
τ
֒→ h, e ′
h,K[e/•]
τ
→ h,K[e ′/•]
γ
ϵ
→∗ γ
γ
τ
→ γ ′ γ ′
τ ′
→∗ γ ′′
γ
τ ·τ ′
→∗ γ ′′
Fig. 1. The labeled head reduction relation ֒→, the labeled small-step relation→, and the labeled reachability
relation→∗
We assume a set Vars of program variables and IOTags of primitive I/O tags.
We define let x := e in e ′ = (λx . e ′)(e) and e; e ′ = let x := e in e ′ where x does not appear in e ′.
We define true = inl(()) and false = inr(()), and if e then e1 else e2 = cases(e, λx . e1, λx . e2) where
x does not appear in e1 or e2. Furthermore, we define nil = inl(()) and cons(e, e
′) = inr((e, e ′)). We
encode characters as tuples of booleans and strings as lists of characters.
To define the language’s semantics, we define the values and the evaluation contexts as follows:
ℓ ∈ Locs
v ∈ Vals ::= () | inl(v) | inr(v) | (v,v) | λx . e | ℓ
K ∈ Ctxts ::= • | inl(K) | inr(K) | (K , e) | (v,K)
| cases(K , e, e) | fst(K) | snd(K) | K(e) | v(K) | assert(K)
| ref(K) | !K | K ← e | v ← K | t(K)
We assume an infinite set Locs of heap locations.
We define the I/O actions α ∈ IOActions ::= t(v,v); in t(v,v ′), we call v the argument and v ′
the result. The traces τ ∈ Traces = IOActions∗ are the lists of I/O actions. We use ϵ to denote the
empty list and − · − to denote list concatenation.
We define the heaps h ∈ Heaps = Locs ⇀fin Vals as the finite partial functions from heap
locations to values.
We define the configurations γ ∈ Configs = Heaps × Exprs. We define a labeled head reduction
relation γ
τ
֒→ γ ′, a labeled small-step relation γ
τ
→ γ ′, and a labeled reachability relation
τ
→∗ in
Figure 1.
We say a configuration is finished if its expression is a value: finished(h, e) ⇔ e ∈ Vals, and that
it has failed if it is not finished and not reducible: failed(γ ) ⇔ ¬finished(γ ) ∧ ∄τ ,γ ′. γ
τ
→ γ ′.
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2.2 I/O Specifications
A foundational way of specifying the desired I/O behavior of a program is in the form of a prefix-
closed1 setT of traces. We say a configuration γ satisfies such a specification, denoted γ  T , if for
any configuration γ ′ reachable from γ via a trace τ ∈ T (implying that both the program and the
environment behave according to τ ), γ ′ has not failed and furthermore for any I/O action t(v,v ′)
that γ ′ can perform, the trace τ · t(v,v ′′) is in T , for some v ′′:
γ  T ⇔ ∀τ ∈ T ,γ ′. γ
τ
→∗ γ ′ ⇒ ¬failed(γ ′) ∧ ∀t ,v,v ′,γ ′′. γ ′
t (v,v ′)
→ γ ′′ ⇒ ∃v ′′. τ · t(v,v ′′) ∈ T
For example (τ  τ ′ denotes that τ is a prefix of τ ′: ∃τ ′′. τ ′ = τ · τ ′′):
putbool(¬getbool(()))  {τ | τ  getbool((),b) · putbool(¬b, ()),b ∈ {true, false}}
where in the program¬e = if e then false else true. This specification constrains both the program
and the environment: it specifies that getbool shall return only booleans, and that the program’s
first action, if any, shall be to get a boolean, and its second action, if any, shall be to put its negation,
and that it shall not perform any further actions. The program is allowed to get stuck (and it
generally does) if getbool returns something other than a boolean.
In this paper, we focus on safety properties only; we do not consider verifying termination or
liveness properties. Still, we may wish to express that a program e satisfies specificationT and that
furthermore, if it terminates, it shall have performed a trace from setT ′v , where v is the program’s
result. We can encode this by extending the set of I/O tags with an exit tag and specifying that
exit(e)  T ∪ {τ | τ  τ ′ · exit(v), τ ′ ∈ T ′v }.
2.3 An Unlabeled Semantics
Most modular program verification approaches proposed in the literature assume an unlabeled
operational semantics and simply verify that the program does not reach a failed configuration.
Fortunately, we can encode satisfaction of an I/O specification into a statement of this form by
using a monitoring semantics, defined by an unlabeled small-step relation over instrumented con-
figurations which include an I/O specification in the form of a prefix-closed set of traces.
For the example programming language, in the monitoring semantics, the step rule for I/O ex-
pressions is as follows:
t(v,v ′) ∈ T
T ,h, t(v) ֒→ {τ | t(v,v ′) · τ ∈ T },h,v ′
The other step rules do not affect, and are not affected by, the I/O specification.
Lemma 2.1. If τ ∈ T and h, e
τ
→∗ h′, e ′ then (T ,h, e) →∗ ({τ ′ | τ · τ ′ ∈ T },h′, e ′).
We say a configuration γ is safe, denoted safe(γ ), if no failed configuration is reachable from it.
Theorem 2.2. If safe((T ,h, e)) then h, e  T .
3 RECAP OF THE PETRI NET APPROACH
In this section, we recall the I/O specification approach presented by Penninckx et al. [2015].2
In subsequent sections, we propose a number of refinements to this approach, to achieve more
abstract I/O specifications.
1A set T is prefix-closed if τ · τ ′ ∈ T implies τ ∈ T .
2Our presentation differs in unimportant ways from that of Penninckx et al. [2015].
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3.1 Petri nets for I/O specification
A Petri net is defined by a set of places P , ranged over by p and q, and a set N of transitions. A
marking V ∈ Markings = P → N of a Petri net maps each place to the number of tokens present at
that place. Given a marking, a transition can fire if there is a token at each of its pre-places. Firing
the transition removes one token from each of the transition’s pre-places and adds one token to
each of its post-places.
We use the following notation formarkings:V ⊎V ′ = λp.V (p)+V ′(p); 0 = λp. 0; {[p]} = 0[p := 1];
{[p,q]} = {[p]} ⊎ {[q]}.
Petri nets can be used to denote I/O specifications by labeling some transitions with I/O actions.
In particular, we will use Petri nets whose transitions ν are of the following form:
ν ∈ N ::= t(p,v,v,q) | split(p,q,q′) | join(p,p ′,q) | noop(p,q)
where p,p ′ ∈ P are the pre-places and q,q′ ∈ P are the post-places.
A Petri net, given by its set N ⊆ N of transitions, defines a labeled step relation → and a
corresponding labeled reachability relation→∗ on markings:
t(p,v,v ′,q) ∈ N
V ⊎ {[p]}
t (v,v ′)
→ V ⊎ {[q]}
split(p,q,q′) ∈ N
V ⊎ {[p]}
ϵ
→ V ⊎ {[q,q′]}
join(p,p ′,q) ∈ N
V ⊎ {[p,p ′]}
ϵ
→ V ⊎ {[q]}
noop(p,q) ∈ N
V ⊎ {[p]}
ϵ
→ V ⊎ {[q]}
We define TracesN (V ) = {τ | ∃V
′. V
τ
→∗ V ′}. Notice that this set is always prefix-closed.
3.2 A Separation Logic for I/O Verification
We can verify that a program satisfies the I/O specification implied by a marking of a Petri net
by means of a Hoare logic (more specifically: a separation logic) whose assertions describe a heap
and a marking: Asns = P(Heaps ×Markings).3
We define ℓ 7→ v = {(h,V ) | ℓ ∈ dom(h) ∧ h(ℓ) = v} and token(p) = {(h,V ) | V (p) > 0}. We
define P ∗ P ′ = {(h′′,V ⊎V ′) | (h,V ) ∈ P ∧ (h′,V ′) ∈ P ′ ∧ h′′ = h ⊎ h′} where h′′ = h ⊎ h′ means
dom(h) ∩ dom(h′) = ∅ ∧ Graph(h′′) = Graph(h) ∪ Graph(h′).
We define T ,h  P ⇔ ∃V . TracesN (V ) ⊆ T ∧ (h,V ) ∈ P .
We define the meaning of correctness judgments:
{P} e {Q} ⇔ ∀T ∈ ResDet,h. T ,h  P ⇒ safe(T ,h, e,Q)
where
ResDet = {T | ∀τ , t ,v,v1,v2. τ · t(v,v1) ∈ T ∧ τ · t(v,v2) ∈ T ⇒ v1 = v2}
and
safe(T ,h, e,Q) ⇔ safe((T ,h, e)) ∧ ∀T ′,h′,v . (T ,h, e) →∗ (T ′,h′,v) ⇒ T ′,h′  Q(v)
and postconditionsQ : Vals → Asns are functions from values to assertions. We lift operations on
assertions pointwise to operations on postconditions. Also, we usually write postconditions using
the notation P(res) instead of λv . P(v), where res stands for result.
The logic supports only result-deterministic I/O specifications, i.e. ones that do not underspecify
the results of I/O actions. However, this is not a significant restriction, since any I/O specification
T can be written as the union of a set T of result-deterministic I/O specifications, and we have the
3P(X ) denotes the powerset of X .
1:6 Willem Penninckx, Amin Timany, and Bart Jacobs
{Q(v)} v {Q}
{P} e[v/x] {Q}
{P} cases(inl(v), λx . e, _) {Q}
{P} e[v/x] {Q}
{P} cases(inr(v), _, λx . e) {Q}
{P} v1 {Q}
{P} fst((v1,v2)) {Q}
{P} v2 {Q}
{P} snd((v1,v2)) {Q}
{P} e[v/x] {Q}
{P} (λx . e)(v) {Q}
{True} ref(v) {res 7→ v} {ℓ 7→ v} !ℓ {ℓ 7→ v ∧ res = v} {ℓ 7→ _} ℓ ← v {ℓ 7→ v}
{token(p) ∧ t(p,v,v ′,q) ∈ N } t(v) {token(q) ∧ res = v ′}
{P} e {Q} ∀v . {Q(v)} K[v/•] {Q ′}
{P} K[e/•] {Q ′}
P ⊑ P ′ {P ′} e {Q} Q ⊑ Q ′
{P} e {Q ′}
{P} e {Q}
{P ∗ R} e {Q ∗ R}
∀i ∈ I . {Pi } e {Q}
{
⋃
i
Pi } e {Q}
P ⊆ P ′
P ⊑ P ′
P ⊑ P ′
P ∗ R ⊑ P ′ ∗ R
split(p,q,q′) ∈ N
token(p) ⊑ token(q) ∗ token(q′)
join(p,p ′,q) ∈ N
token(p) ∗ token(p ′) ⊑ token(q)
noop(p,q) ∈ N
token(p) ⊑ token(q)
Fig. 2. Proof rules of the separation logic for I/O verification
property (∀T ∈ T . γ  T ) ⇒ γ 
⋃
T . For each T ∈ T , γ  T can be verified using the Hoare
logic.
We say an assertion P precedes an assertion P ′, denoted P ⊑ P ′, if∀(h,V ) ∈ P . ∃V ′. TracesN (V
′) ⊆
TracesN (V ) ∧ (h,V
′) ∈ P ′.
From these definitions, we can derive the proof rules shown in Figure 2.
3.3 Examples
The following diagram denotes a Petri net with places P = {p1, p2, p3}, marking V = {[p1]}, and
transitions N = {putchar(p1, ’h’, (), p2), putchar(p2, ’i’, (), p3)}, where putchar ∈ IOTags is an
I/O tag:
p1 putchar(’h’, ()) p2 putchar(’i’, ()) p3
When used as an I/O specification, it allows the program to perform the I/O actions putchar(’h’, ())
and putchar(’i’, ()), once, in that order. Indeed, given the marking shown (one token in place p1
and zero tokens in places p2 and p3), the transition labeled putchar(’h’, ()) can fire (because all of
its pre-places have a token), which removes one token from each of the transition’s pre-places and
adds one to each of its post-places. (No other transition can fire initially.) If it does, in the resulting
marking, only the other transition can fire, etc.
Per the Hoare logic presented above, for any places p,q ∈ P we have the following Hoare triple
for the I/O expression putchar(c), where c is a character:
{token(p) ∧ putchar_(p, c, (),q)} putchar(c) {token(q)}
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where we use the shorthand t_(p,v,v ′,q) for t(p,v,v ′,q) ∈ N . In the remainder, we will abbreviate
the action putchar(v, ()) to putchar(v) and the transition putchar(p,v, (),q) to putchar(p,v,q).
Assuming the Petri net above, the following Hoare triple expresses that a functionmain satisfies
the I/O specification denoted by the Petri net:4
{token(p1)} main() {token(p3)} (1)
However, when specifying functions, it is preferable that the Hoare triple itself express any neces-
sary assumptions about the Petri net, like so:
∀P,N ,p1,p2,p3.
{
token(p1) ∧ putchar_(p1, ’h’,p2)
∧ putchar_(p2, ’i’,p3)
}
main() {token(p3)}
This specification universally quantifies over the set of places P , the set of transitions N , and the
places p1, p2, and p3. It is easy to see that this specification is indeed equivalent to specification 1
above, in terms of the I/O traces main is allowed to produce. In the remainder, we will always im-
plicitly universally quantify over the set of places, the set of transitions, and any freemetavariables
(including ones ranging over places) of a specification.
Consider now the following implementation of function main:5
function main() { putchar(’h’); putchar(’i’) }
We can verify that this function satisfies its specification using the Hoare rules from Figure 2.
Such a proof is commonly summarized as a Hoare proof outline that mentions the most salient
intermediate assertions, like so:
function main() {
{token(p1) ∧ putchar_(p1, ’h’,p2) ∧ putchar_(p2, ’i’,p3)}
putchar(’h’);
{token(p2) ∧ putchar_(p2, ’i’,p3)}
putchar(’i’)
{token(p3)}
}
3.3.1 Underspecification. One can easily express specifications that allow multiple behaviors, by
specifying a Petri net where there are multiple paths between the start and destination places. For
example:
p1
...
putchar(’a’)
putchar(’z’)
p2
4We use notation f () to abbreviate function application f (()).
5We use notation function f () { e } to mean f = λx . e , where x does not appear in e . Similarly, we use function f (x ) { e }
to mean f = λx . e and function f (x, y) { e } to mean f = λargs. e[fst(args)/x, snd(args)/y].
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The corresponding Hoare triple, along with one example implementation that satisfies it, is as
follows:
function put_some_char() {
{token(p1) ∧ ∀c ∈ {’a’, . . . , ’z’}. putchar_(p1, c,p2)}
putchar(’a’)
{token(p2)}
}
3.3.2 Compositionality. The approach allows one to define composite I/O actions on top of prim-
itive ones, such that client code need not be aware of whether a given action is primitive or not.
For example, we can define a composite I/O action putchars as follows:6
putchars_(p1, ϵ,p2) = noop_(p1,p2)
putchars_(p1, c · c,p3) =
∃p2. putchar_(p1, c,p2) ∧ putchars_(p2, c,p3)
function putchars(c) {
{token(p) ∧ putchars_(p, c,q)}
mat c with
| ϵ ⇒ ()
| c · c ′ ⇒ putchar(c); putchars(c ′)
{token(q)}
}
Notice that if c = ϵ , then token(p) ⊑ token(q). Notice also that verification of client code can
proceed as if putchars were a primitive I/O tag instead of a function, and putchars(c) were a
primitive I/O expression instead of a function application, and putchars_ referred directly to a
transition of the Petri net instead of being a predicate defined on top of it.
3.3.3 Input. The approach allows one to express input-dependent output requirements, as well
as assumptions about the input that will be received. For example, assume getchar ∈ IOTags. Then
for all characters c we have the following Hoare triple:7
{token(p) ∧ getchar_(p, c,q)} getchar() {res = c ∧ token(q)}
The following specification expresses that function toUpper shall perform a getchar action, that
this action’s result shall be a lowercase letter (a constraint on the environment), and that the
program shall subsequently output the uppercase version of that letter:
function toUpper() {
∀P,N ,p1, c,p2,p3.{
token(p1) ∧ getchar_(p1, c,p2) ∧ putchar_(p2, c − ’a’ + ’A’,p3)
∧ ’a’ ≤ c ≤ ’z’
}
let ch := getchar() in putchar(ch − ’a’ + ’A’)
{token(p3)}
}
6We use mat notation to abbreviate the corresponding combinations of cases, fst, and snd.
7Notation getchar(p, c, q) abbreviates transition getchar(p, (), c, q).
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(For clarity, we here show the universal quantifications that we will usually leave implicit.) Any
particular result-deterministic Petri net that satisfies the precondition has only one getchar tran-
sition starting in p1. However, since the specification is universally quantified over all such Petri
nets, it implies that the program properly handles all 26 letters.8
3.3.4 Specification-level concurrency. Suppose we want the program to read two characters and
print them back to us. We do not want to force the program to print the first character before it
reads the second character. We even want to allow the program to read the second character while,
concurrently, it is printing the first character.9 A Petri net that expresses this specification is as
follows:
p1 split
p2 getchar(c1) p3 getchar(c2) p4
p5 putchar(c1) p6 putchar(c2) p7
join p8
When the split transition fires, it consumes the token at p1 and produces two tokens: one at p2
and another one at p5. (Notice that this specification even allows the program to print the first
character (and the second character!) while reading the first character, but of course, that is not
physically possible.)
The corresponding separation logic specification, with a matching proof outline, is as follows:
function cat2() {{
token(p1) ∧ split_(p1,p2,p5) ∧ getchar_(p2, c1,p3) ∧ getchar_(p3, c2,p4)
∧ putchar_(p5, c1,p6) ∧ putchar_(p6, c2,p7) ∧ join_(p4,p7,p8)
}
// token(p1) ⊑ token(p2) ∗ token(p5)
{token(p2) ∗ token(p5)}
let ch1 := getchar() in let ch2 := getchar() in
{token(p4) ∗ token(p5) ∧ ch1 = c1 ∧ ch2 = c2}
putchar(ch1); putchar(ch2)
// token(p4) ∗ token(p7) ⊑ token(p8)
{token(p8)}
}
A somewhat more realistic version of cat is one that reads characters forever and prints them
back at its leasure:
{token(p1) ∗ token(p2) ∧ getchars_(p1, ®c) ∧ putchars_(p2, ®c)} cat() {False}
where
getchars_(p1, c · ®c) = ∃p2. getchar_(p1, c,p2) ∧ getchars_(p2, ®c)
putchars_(p1, c · ®c) = ∃p2. putchar_(p1, c,p2) ∧ putchars_(p2, ®c)
Here, we intend the weakest solution of these equations; they describe an infinite Petri net. ®c
denotes an infinite sequence of characters.
8The restriction to result-deterministic Petri nets is implied by the semantics of Hoare triples given in §3.2.
9We treat concurrency in the program formally in §7.
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4 ASSERTIONS AS PLACES
4.1 Motivating example: buffered output
On Unix-like systems, putchar is a C run-time library function that is implemented in terms of the
write system call, which writes a sequence of characters:
write_(p1, ϵ,p2) = (p2 = p1)
write_(p1, c · c,p3) = ∃p2. write_char_(p1, c,p2) ∧write_(p2, c,p3)
{token(p1) ∧write_(p1, c,p2)} write(c) {token(p2)}
Note: we assume that the effect of write(c · c ′) is indistinguisable from that of write(c);write(c ′);
to model this, we take write_char as a primitive I/O tag and we define write_ in terms of it.
Accordingly, in the formal setting we assume write is some function implemented in terms of
write_char(c) primitive I/O expressions.
Since system calls are expensive, putchar buffers output in a global variable:
function putchar(c) {
{buffer 7→ c ∗ token(p1) ∧write_(p1, c,p2) ∧ write_char_(p2, c,p3)}
if |!buffer| = 1000 then {
write(!buffer); buffer← ϵ
}
buffer ←!buffer · c
{∃c ′,p ′1. buffer 7→ c
′ ∗ token(p ′1) ∧ write_(p
′
1, c
′
,p3)}
}
The specification for putchar that we show here does not hide the details of how it is implemented.
For example, it names the global variable buffer. We would like to define predicate putchar_ such
that this implementation satisfies the simple, abstract specification for putchar that we showed on
p. 6. Notice that this requires that we unify the postcondition above with token(q), for some place
q. Clearly, in the approach of §3, that is impossible, since token(q) constrains only the marking,
not the heap.
4.2 Assertions as places
What we want is a specification for putchar that looks exactly like the one on p. 6, and that there-
fore allows the client program specifications and proofs shown in §3.3, but which at the same time
can be unified with the specification for the buffering implementation shown above.
The main contribution of this paper is the observation that we can achieve this by introducing,
to complement the existing primitive notion of places and the existing primitive token assertion
form, an abstract notion of places, and an abstract version of the token assertion form, where places
are assertions, and token(p) simply means p.
We can then unify the abstract reading of the specification of putchar on p. 6 with the one above
by defining putchar_ as follows (where p1,p2 ∈ Asns):
putchar_(p1, c,p2) = ∃p
′
1,p
′
2.
p1 = buffer_token(p
′
1) ∧ write_char_(p
′
1, c,p
′
2) ∧ p2 = buffer_token(p
′
2)
where
buffer_token(p) = ∃c,p0. buffer 7→ c ∗ token(p0) ∧ write_(p0, c,p)
Note: we will continue to write token(p) instead of just p when we wish to point out that we are
applying the Petri net specification style.
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Notice that by adopting the abstract reading of the specification of p. 6 as the specification of
putchar, we can build proofs of clients of putchar that are agnostic as to whether putchar is a prim-
itive I/O tag, a function that performs composite I/O (i.e. multiple I/O actions, as exemplified by
the putchars example in §3.3.2), or even a function that performs both I/O and heap manipulation,
such as the buffering implementation above.
Notice that in case putchar is a primitive I/O tag, the abstract reading of its specification is
satisfied trivially by the primitive reading, if we define t_(p,v,v ′,q), where t is a primitive I/O tag
and p and q are assertions, to mean ∃p ′,q′ ∈ P . p = token(p ′) ∧ t_(p ′,v,v ′,q′) ∧ q = token(q′).
4.3 Composing I/O specifications
Consider the following program:
function start() {
{token(p1) ∧ beep_(p1,p2) ∧ write_(p2, ’!’,p3)}
let buffer := ref ϵ in
function putchar(c) { · · · }
function flush() { · · · }
function main() {
{token(q1) ∧ beep_(q1,q2) ∧ putchar_(q2, ’!’,q3) ∧ flush_(q3,q4)}
beep(); putchar(’!’); flush()
{token(q4)}
}
main()
{token(p3)}
}
Function main is written in terms of the C run-time library functions putchar and flush, as well
as the system call beep. We would like its specification and verification to be independent of the
implementation of putchar and flush in terms of the buffer. Function start, which first initializes
the C run-time library’s internal data structures and then calls main, is specified purely in terms
of system calls.
Functionmain’s specification shown above is of the form {P(q1,q2,q3,q4)} main() {Q(q4)}. We
can prove easily that (the abstract reading of) this Hoare triple holds for arbitrary values of q1,
q2, q3, and q4. This means that when verifying a particular call ofmain, we can instantiate main’s
specification with arbitrary particular values for these variables.
To verify the call of main in start, we need to prove the following Hoare triple:
{buffer 7→ ϵ ∗ token(p1) ∧ beep_(p1,p2) ∧ write_(p2, ’!’,p3)}
main()
{token(p3)}
Specifically, we need to find values for q1, q2, q3, and q4 such that the two implications
buffer 7→ ϵ ∗ token(p1) ∧ beep_(p1,p2) ∧ write_(p2, ’!’,p3)
⇓
token(q1) ∧ beep_(q1,q2) ∧ putchar_(q2, ’!’,q3) ∧ flush_(q3,q4)
and
token(q4) ⇒ token(p3)
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hold.
Proving the first implication requires that predicate beep_ satisfy a frame property:
beep_(p1,p2) ⇒ beep_(p1 ∗ R,p2 ∗ R)
Therefore, it is useful when applying this approach to introduce a convention to have such abstract
transition predicates satisfy the frame property, as well as the followingweakening property, similar
to Hoare logic’s Rule of Consequence:
p ′1 ⊑ p1 p2 ⊑ p
′
2
beep(p1,p2) ⇒ beep(p
′
1,p
′
2)
To comply with this convention, we redefine predicate putchar_ as follows:
putchar_(p1, c,p2) = ∃p
′
1,p
′
2,R.
(p1 ⊑ buffer_token(p
′
1) ∗ R) ∧ write_char_(p
′
1, c,p
′
2) ∧ (buffer_token(p
′
2) ∗ R ⊑ p2)
Furthermore, we define flush_ as follows:
flush_(p1,p2) = ∃p
′
,R. (p1 ⊑ buffer_token(p
′) ∗ R) ∧ (buffer 7→ ϵ ∗ p ′ ∗ R ⊑ p2)
We can then verify the call ofmain by taking q1 = p1 ∗ buffer 7→ ϵ and q2 = p2 ∗ buffer 7→ ϵ and
q3 = buffer_token(p3) and q4 = buffer 7→ ϵ ∗p3. Notice that q2 ⇒ buffer_token(p2), as required by
putchar_(q2, ’!’,q3).
We have verified this example using Iris [Timany and Jacobs 2019].
4.4 Rewriting I/O specifications
We define the abstract reading of the special transition predicates split_, join_, and noop_ as fol-
lows:
split_(p1,p2,p3) = (p1 ⊑ p2 ∗ p3)
join_(p1,p2,p3) = (p1 ∗ p2 ⊑ p3)
noop_(p1,p2) = (p1 ⊑ p2)
It follows that in the abstract reading we have many equivalences between I/O specifications
which are not available in the primitive reading. For example:
(∃p ′. split_(p,q1,p
′) ∧ split_(p ′,q2,q3)) ⇔ (∃p
′
. split_(p,p ′,q3) ∧ split_(p
′
,q1,q2))
Here, too, the continued use of the split_, join_, and noop_ syntax is a purely stylistic choice.
4.5 Transition predicates as abstract nested Hoare triples
Readerswill have noted the similarity between our abstract transition predicates, such as putchar_(P, c,Q),
and Hoare triples {P} putchar(c) {Q}. Both specify a precondition and a postcondition for an ac-
tion, and both satisfy the Frame rule and the Rule of Consequence. Both can be used as first-class
assertions in modern program logics that support nested Hoare triples (e.g. [Schwinghammer et al.
2011] and Iris [Krebbers et al. 2017]).
However, note also the differences: transition predicates are more abstract, in that they need
not correspond to a particular function or program expression. (See e.g. thewrite_char_ transition
predicate introduced at the start of this section to model the effect of the write system call.) Fur-
thermore, transition predicates can be folded and unfolded by modules that have access to their
definition. Thirdly, whereas for output actions such as putchar nested Hoare triples could mostly
be used instead of transition predicates in our I/O specifications, for input actions such as getchar
this is less straightforward.
Abstract I/O Specification 1:13
5 DEALINGWITH INPUT USING PROPHECY VARIABLES
5.1 A motivating example
Consider the following specification for a chat server. For simplicity, we assume there is a single
chat room, with exactly two members, with nicknames n1 and n2.


(token(r1) ∧ receiveFromNick_(r1,n1, µ1))
∗ (token(r2) ∧ receiveFromNick_(r2,n2, µ2))
∗ (token(s) ∧ (∀µ ∈ µn11 | | µ
n2
2 . sendToNicks_(s, µ)))


serveChatRoom()
{false}
where
sendToNicks_(s, µ) =
∃s1, s2. split_(s, s1, s2) ∧ sendToNick_(s1,n1, µ) ∧ sendToNick_(s2,n2, µ)
We use symbol µ and variants to range over infinite sequences of messages, mn to denote the
quoted message n says ’m’, lifted also to sequences of messages, and µ1 | | µ2 to denote the set
of all interleavings of µ1 and µ2.
The specification states that the chat server sends to each member the same sequence of mes-
sages µ , which is some interleaving of the sequences of messages received from each member.
Notice that in this Petri net, there are many split transitions outgoing from place s , but since there
is only a single token in this place, only one of these transitions can fire in any particular execu-
tion. This models the fact that the chat server must choose which interleaving of the incoming
messages it will send out.
For simplicity, we assume that the following network API is available to the chat server:
{token(r ) ∧ receiveFromNick_(r ,n,m · µ)}
receiveFromNick(n)
{∃r ′. token(r ′) ∧ receiveFromNick_(r ′,n, µ) ∧ res =m}
{token(s) ∧ sendToNick_(s,n,m · µ)}
sendToNick(n,m)
{∃s ′. token(s ′) ∧ sendToNick_(s ′,n, µ)}
We implement the chat server by forking one thread per member to receive messages from that
member and insert them into a shared queue or channel, and, in a separate thread, dequeuing
messages from the channel and sending them to each member; see Fig. 3.
We wish to specify and verify each of these threads in a way that abstracts over the fact that
all threads are running in the same process and communicating through an in-process shared
queue. Indeed, as far as functions pumpFromNick and pumpRoom are concerned, the channel
might as well be an inter-process or inter-machine communication construct, so it makes sense
that we specify sending and receiving on the channel exactly analogously to the network APIs
sendToNick and receiveFromNick:
{token(s) ∧ send_(s, c,m · µ)}
send(c,m)
{∃s ′. token(s ′) ∧ send_(s ′, c, µ)}
{token(r ) ∧ receive_(r , c,m · µ)}
receive(c)
{∃r ′. token(r ′) ∧ receive_(r ′, c, µ) ∧ res =m}
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function serveChatRoom() {
let roomChan := newChannel() in
fork pumpFromNick(n1, roomChan);
fork pumpFromNick(n2, roomChan);
pumpRoom(roomChan)
}
function pumpFromNick(n, roomChan) {{
(token(r ) ∧ receiveFromNick_(r ,n, µ))
∗ (token(s) ∧ send_(s, roomChan, µn))
}
loop {
letm := receiveFromNick(n) in
send(roomChan,mn)
}
{false}
}
function pumpRoom(roomChan) {

(token(r ) ∧ receive_(r , roomChan, µ))
∗ (token(s1) ∧ sendToNick_(s1,n1, µ))
∗ (token(s2) ∧ sendToNick_(s2,n2, µ))


loop {
letm := receive(roomChan) in
sendToNick(n1,m); sendToNick(n2,m)
}
{false}
}
Fig. 3. Chat server implementation
Verifying the implementations of functions pumpFromNick and pumpRoom against their specifi-
cations is straightforward. Verifying the main function serveChatRoom is straightforward as well,
provided that we may assume the following specification for function newChannel:10
{true}
newChannel()

(token(s1) ∧ send_(s1, res, µ1))
∗ (token(s2) ∧ send_(s2, res, µ2))
∗ (∃µ ∈ µ1 | | µ2. token(r ) ∧ receive_(r , res, µ))


6 A PROGRAMMING LANGUAGEWITH PROPHECY VARIABLES
Notice that verifying an implementation of the channel construct, for example in terms of a shared
queue, against these specifications is not possible using a straightforward application of our Hoare
logic from §3.2, or other existing program logics such as Iris [Krebbers et al. 2017]. Indeed, in
these logics, the precondition of receive constrains only the pre-state of a call of receive. Since,
starting from this same pre-state, many different thread schedulings, and, consequently, many
10For simplicity, this specification is specialized for the case of two senders and one receiver.
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different return values of receive are generally possible, there is no relationship between the pre-
state and the result value so the precondition cannot express such a relationship. A solution to this
problem has been long known, however; it is known as prophecy variables [Abadi and Lamport
1991; Zhang et al. 2012].
In order to apply our abstract I/O specification and verification approach to in-memory input
constructs such as channels in the context of logics such as Iris, then, we propose to apply this
well-known idea of prophecy variables. In particular, we propose to apply such logics not directly
to the actual programming language and program involved, but to a version of the programming
language and the program instrumented with prophecy variables. The end-to-end approach for
verifying a program, then, is to first verify correctness of the instrumented version using a logic like
Iris, and then to apply an erasure theorem that maps this correctness property to a corresponding
property of the original program.
In this paper, we assume that the correctness property of interest can be expressed as the pro-
gram not getting stuck. This is true whenever the property can be translated into run-time checks
inserted into the program. The erasure theorem needed, then, is simply that if no instrumented
execution gets stuck, then no erased execution gets stuck.
In the remainder of this section, we first elaborate this idea for simple prophecy variables that
are assigned an arbitrary value once. We then discuss prophecy variables to which a sequence of
values is assigned incrementally. Next, we show how to build constrained prophecy variables on
top of these in the logic. In the next sections, we show how these prophecy variables can be used
to verify a channel implementation against the abstract I/O specifications proposed above.
6.1 Simple prophecy variables
Simple prophecy variables can be added to a programming language by adding a type of prophecy
variable identifiers, a command create_pvar() for allocating and returning a prophecy variable
identifier and associating with it a prophecy value, and a command assign_pvar(ι,v), which assigns
value v to the prophecy variable with identifier ι. After the assignment operation completes, we
have that the assigned value equals the prophecy value.
We can think of these operations operationally as follows: the creation operation picks an ar-
bitrary prophecy value nondeterministically; the assignment operation either does nothing if the
assigned value equals the prophecy value, or enters an infinite loop otherwise.
We formalize this as follows. Suppose the base language’s semantics is defined using a small-step
relation (σ , e) → (σ ′, e ′), where σ ranges over states and e over expressions, including a rule
(σ , e) ֒→ (σ ′, e ′)
(σ ,K[e/•]) → (σ ′,K[e ′/•])
for lifting step rules over evaluation contexts K . An example of such a language is our program-
ming language from §2 and its monitoring semantics defined in §2.3, where states σ = (T ,h)
consist of a set of I/O traces T and a heap h. We extend the definitions of expressions, values, and
evaluation contexts as follows:
ι ∈ PVarIdents
e ::= · · · | create_pvar() | assign_pvar(e, e)
v ::= · · · | ι
K ::= · · · | assign_pvar(•, e) | assign_pvar(ι, •)
We extend states with a prophecy heap ρ : PVarIdents ⇀fin Vals, a finite partial function from
prophecy variable identifiers to values. Existing commands leave the prophecy heap unchanged;
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the step rules for the new commands are as follows:
CreatePVar
ι < dom(ρ)
(σ , ρ, create_pvar()) ֒→ (σ , ρ[ι := v], ι)
AssignPVarMatch
ι ∈ dom(ρ) ρ(ι) = v
(σ , ρ, assign_pvar(ι,v)) ֒→ (σ , ρ[ι := ⊥], ())
AssignPVarNoMatch
ι ∈ dom(ρ) ρ(ι) , v
(σ , ρ, assign_pvar(ι,v)) ֒→ (σ , ρ, assign_pvar(ι,v))
Notice that successfully assigning a prophecy variable removes it from the prophecy heap.
From this semantics, we can derive the following Hoare logic proof rules for the new commands:
{true} create_pvar() {∃v . pvar(res,v)}
{pvar(ι,v)} assign_pvar(ι,v ′) {v = v ′}
where the assertion pvar(ι,v) = {(σ , ρ) | ι ∈ dom(ρ)∧ρ(ι) = v} denotes the existence of a prophecy
variable with identifier ι and prophecy value v .
For verification using prophecy variables to be sound, we need the property that if a program
instrumented with prophecy variables does not get stuck, then the original program also does not
get stuck. This is not immediately obvious, because of the AssignPVarNoMatch rule. Therefore,
we first prove erasure to an intermediate semantics for instrumented programs that still tracks
prophecy variables (in particular, it tracks the set I of allocated prophecy variable identifiers) but
that does not have the looping behavior:
CreatePVar-I
ι < I
(σ , I , create_pvar()) ֒→I (σ , I ∪ {ι}, ι)
AssignPVar-I
ι ∈ I
(σ , I , assign_pvar(ι,v)) ֒→I (σ , I \ {ι}, ())
The essential property of the instrumented semantics is that if a configuration is reachable in the
intermediate semantics, then every corresponding configuration, i.e. with every possible assign-
ment of prophecy values to the allocated prophecy variables, is reachable in the instrumented
semantics:
Lemma 6.1. If (σ0, ∅, e0) →
∗
I (σ , I , e) and dom(ρ) = I then (σ0, ∅, e0) →
∗ (σ , ρ, e).
Proof. By induction on the number of steps and case analysis on the step rule. For ruleAssignPVar-
I, the induction hypothesis guarantees that a configuration with a prophecy value that matches
the assigned value is reachable. 
We can now prove that if a configuration is safe under the instrumented semantics, then it is
safe under the intermediate semantics:
Theorem 6.2. If safe((σ0, ∅, e0)) then safeI((σ0, ∅, e0)).
Proof. Assume (σ0, ∅, e0) →
∗
I (σ , I , e). Pick some arbitrary ρ such that dom(ρ) = I . By the
lemma above, we have that (σ0, ∅, e0) →
∗ (σ , ρ, e). By the premise we have that this configura-
tion can make a step. By case analysis on the step rule, it is easy to prove that the intermediate
semantics can make a similar step. In particular, if the instrumented semantics makes an Assign-
PVarNoMatch step, the intermediate semantics can make an AssignPVar-I step. (This theorem
does not claim that the resulting configurations correspond in any way.) 
A machine-checked version of this development is available citeiris-io-2-0.
Notice, now, that if an instrumented program does not get stuck under the intermediate se-
mantics, then for this program the assign_pvar command is equivalent to skip. If furthermore
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we assume that no other constructs of the programming language allow inspection of a prophecy
variable identifier (as is the case for the instrumented version of our programming language from
§2), we can conclude that the type of prophecy variable identifiers is equivalent to the unit type
and create_pvar is equivalent to the unit value literal ().
6.2 Incremental prophecy variables
Above, we introduced a simple form of prophecy variables, which are assigned once. However,
notice that in the case of the channels example, the prophecy value µ is a sequence where each
element corresponds to a different receive operation, occurring at a different point in the execu-
tion of the program. To support this, we here propose a variant of prophecy variables where the
prophecy value predicts a sequence of assigned values.
The syntax of instrumented programs does not change.
We update the definition of prophecy heaps to map identifiers to sequences of values:
ρ : PVarIdents ⇀fin Values
ω
We update the step rules as follows:
CreatePVar
ι < dom(ρ)
(σ , ρ, create_pvar()) ֒→ (σ , ρ[ι := µ], ι)
AssignPVarMatch
ι ∈ dom(ρ) ρ(ι) = v · µ
(σ , ρ, assign_pvar(ι,v)) ֒→ (σ , ρ[ι := µ], ())
AssignPVarNoMatch
ι ∈ dom(ρ) ρ(ι) = v ′ · µ v , v ′
(σ , ρ, assign_pvar(ι,v)) ֒→ (σ , ρ, assign_pvar(ι,v))
Notice that after a successful assignment, the assigned value is popped from the front of the
prophecy value in the prophecy heap.
This semantics allows us to derive the following Hoare rules:
{true} create_pvar() {∃µ . pvar(res, µ)}
{pvar(ι,v · µ)} assign_pvar(ι,v ′) {pvar(ι, µ) ∧v = v ′}
The intermediate semantics remains unchanged, and the erasure proof proceeds completely anal-
ogously.
6.3 Constrained incremental prophecy variables
Above, prophecy variable creation produces a completely arbitrary prophecy value. However, in
the channels example we need to know at the point of channel creation that the sequence of
received values will be an interleaving of the sequences of sent values. Therefore, we here propose
a third type of prophecy variables, called constrained incremental prophecy variables, that allow
the specification, at prophecy variable creation time, of a constraint on the sequence of assigned
values. This constraint is enforced at assignment time, but we have, already at creation time, that
the prophecy value satisfies the constraint. An important side condition for this to be sound is of
course that the constraint be satisfiable.
We can in fact build this feature in the logic, on top of the instrumented semantics for uncon-
strained incremental prophecy variables proposed above. Specifically, we can prove the following
Hoare proof rules, where cpvar(ι,M , µ) denotes a constrained prophecy variable where the se-
quence of assigned values is constrained to be in the set of sequencesM .
{M , ∅} create_pvar(M) {∃µ . cpvar(res,M , µ) ∧ µ ∈ M}
{cpvar(ι,M ,v · µ) ∧M[v ′] , ∅} assign_pvar(ι,v ′) {cpvar(ι,M[v ′], µ) ∧v = v ′}
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whereM[v] = {µ | v · µ ∈ M}.
When implementing constrained prophecy variable creation on top of unconstrained prophecy
variable creation, there are two cases to consider after creating the unconstrained prophecy vari-
able: either the prophecy value satisfies the constraint, or it does not. Our strategy, then, is as
follows: if it does, expose this value as the prophecy value of the constrained prophecy variable.
Otherwise, pick an arbitrary value that does satisfy the constraint, and expose that as the prophecy
value of the constrained prophecy variable. At prophecy variable assignment time, it will turn out
that the unconstrained prophecy value did satisfy the constraint after all.
To apply this idea to the incremental case, at prophecy variable creation time, intuitively we pick
as the constrained prophecy value the sequence that satisfies the constraint and that maximally
matches the unconstrained prophecy value, i.e. that has a maximal-length prefix that matches the
unconstrained prophecy value. As assignments occur, it will gradually become clear that the whole
unconstrained prophecy value did satisfy the constraint after all.
However, such a maximally-matching sequence does not necessarily exist. Indeed, consider the
constraintMAB = {A
n · Bω | n ∈ N}, that is, the set of all sequences consisting of a finite number of
As followed by an infinite number of Bs. Now, consider the unconstrained prophecy value µ = Aω .
There is no element ofMAB that maximally matches µ .
Note, however, that the proof rules proposed above do not enforce that the program adheres to
a constraint such asMAB. Indeed, a program that assigns As indefinitely can be verified using these
proof rules. Still, note also that all finite prefixes of the execution of this program do adhere to the
constraint.
Therefore, in this paper we restrict ourselves to partial correctness verification, i.e. verification
of safety properties, rather than liveness properties. This means that it suffices to consider only
each finite prefix of the executions of the program.
In this restricted setting, we can in fact solve the problem. We exploit the fact that if the execu-
tion prefixwe are currently considering has lengthn, then atmostn prophecy variable assignments
can occur in this execution. It follows that the elements of the constrained prophecy value at posi-
tion n and after will never be “tested” and therefore need not match the unconstrained prophecy
value. Therefore, it suffices to pick a constrained prophecy value that maximally matches the un-
constrained one up to the length of the execution prefix.
We can encode this in Iris, a logic for partial correctness verification, using its later operator:
⊲P (pronounced later P) holds for execution prefixes of length n if P holds for execution prefixes
of length n′ < n. In particular, when considering an execution prefix of length 0, we have ⊲False.
We will add a later operator to our Hoare logic in the next section.
Using the later operator, we can define the set maxmatch(µ,M) of elements of M that match µ
maximally up to the length of the execution prefix, as follows:
maxmatch(v · µ,M) =
{
M if M[v] = ∅
{v · µ ′ ∈ M | ⊲ (µ ′ ∈ maxmatch(µ,M[v]))} otherwise
We can then define
cpvar(ι,M , µ) = ∃µ ′. pvar(ι, µ ′) ∧ µ ∈ maxmatch(µ ′,M)
From this definition, and the Hoare rules for incremental prophecy variables seen above, we can
easily prove the proposed Hoare rules for constrained incremental prophecy variables.
We have developed a machine-checked version of constrained incremental prophecy variables
in Coq and integrated it with the Iris logic [Timany and Jacobs 2019].
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7 A PROGRAMMING LANGUAGEWITH I/O, PROPHECY VARIABLES, AND
CONCURRENCY
In this section, we extend our programming language from §2 with a fork command, an atomic
load command 〈!ℓ〉 and a compare-and-set command CAS(ℓ,vold,vnew) (§7.1), and we extend our
Hoare logic with support for concurrency (including ghost cells, shared regions and shared region
invariants) and a later operator (§7.2).
7.1 Programming language syntax and semantics
Starting from the programming language of §2.1, we extend the syntax of expressions and, corre-
spondingly, the syntax of evaluation contexts, as follows:
e ::= · · · | fork(e) | 〈!e〉 | CAS(e, e, e)
K ::= · · · | fork(K) | 〈!K〉 | CAS(K , e, e) | CAS(v,K , e) | CAS(v,v,K)
We update the definition of configurations to include a thread pool, which is a list of expressions:
γ ∈ Configs = States × Exprs∗ where States = Heaps.
The labeled head reduction relation
τ
֒→ now relates a pre-state and a pre-expression to a post-
state, a post-expression, and a list of forked expressions. The step rules for the existing expressions
are unchanged from §2.1, except to specify that these expressions fork no threads. The new proof
rules are as follows, where=dec and ,dec are defined only onDataVals, the set of values constructed
from (), inl, inr, and (−,−):
h, fork(e)
ϵ
֒→ h, (), e
ℓ ∈ dom(h)
h, 〈!ℓ〉
ϵ
֒→ h,h(ℓ), ϵ
ℓ ∈ dom(h) h(ℓ) =dec vold
h,CAS(ℓ,vold,vnew)
ϵ
֒→ h[ℓ := v], true, ϵ
ℓ ∈ dom(h) h(ℓ) ,dec vold
h,CAS(ℓ,vold,vnew)
ϵ
֒→ h, false, ϵ
h, e
τ
֒→ h′, e ′, e f
h, e · K[e/•] · e ′
τ
→ h′, e · K[e ′/•] · e f · e
′
The definition of satisfaction of an I/O specification T by a configuration given in §2.2 applies
unchanged.
We update the definition of a failed configuration as follows: a configuration has failed if any
thread is not finished and not reducible:
failed(h, e) = ∃e ∈ e . e < Vals ∧ ¬∃K , e ′, τ ,h′, e ′′, e f . e = K[e
′/•] ∧ h, e ′
τ
֒→ h′, e ′′, e f
From this labeled semantics, we can construct a unlabeled, monitoring version, with configura-
tions that include an I/O specification in the form of a prefix-closed set of traces, entirely analo-
gously to how we did this for the single-threaded language in §2.3, in such a way that we obtain
the following theorem:
Theorem 7.1. If safe(T ,h, e) then h, e  T .
Starting from this concurrent programming language and its monitoring semantics, we can then
obtain an instrumented language with I/O, concurrency, and incremental prophecy variables, and
both an instrumented and an intermediate semantics for it, exactly as described in §6, that satisfy
the erasure theorem. Configurations γ = (T ,h, ρ, e) of the instrumented semantics consist of an
I/O specification T (a prefix-closed set of I/O traces), a heap h, a prophecy heap ρ, and a thread
pool e (a list of expressions).
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7.2 Hoare logic
Wehere present aminimal Hoare logic that is sufficient to verify the chat server example, including
the channels implementation. For amore complete logic, we refer to the literature (e.g. Krebbers et al.
[2017]). To reason about concurrency, our Hoare logic includes ghost cells, fractional permissions,
and shared regions with (first-order) shared region invariants.
We define the set of chunks α as follows, where ℓˆ ∈ GhostLocs ranges over an infinite set of ghost
locations and vˆ ∈ GhostVals ranges over a set of ghost values, which can be picked arbitrarily for
a given proof:
α ∈ Chunks ::= ℓ 7→ v | ℓˆ 7→ vˆ | pvar(ι, µ) | token(p)
We define the logical heaps H ∈ LogHeaps = Chunks → R+ as the functions from chunks to
fractions, which are nonnegative reals. We lift addition on reals pointwise to logical heaps:H+H ′ =
λα . H (α) + H ′(α). Notation 0 = λ_. 0 denotes the empty logical heap; {[α]} = 0[α := 1] denotes
the logical heap that contains chunk α with fraction 1. We can interpret a markingV as the logical
heap H where H (α) = V (p) if α = token(p), and H (α) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, we can interpret
a heap h as the logical heap H where H (α) = 1 if α = ℓ 7→ v and ℓ ∈ dom(h) and v = h(ℓ), and
H (α) = 0 otherwise, and analogously for a ghost heap and a prophecy heap.
We define the set of shared region invariants I ∈ Invs = P(LogHeaps) as the predicates over logi-
cal heaps. We define the set of assertions P ∈ Asns ⊆ P(N×P(Invs)×LogHeaps) = {P | ∀(n,A,H ) ∈
P,n′,A′. n′ ≤ n ∧ A ⊆ A′ ⇒ (n′,A′,H ) ∈ P} as the predicates over the length of the execution
trace, the set of allocated shared region invariants, and the owned chunk fractions, that are closed
under reducing the length of the execution trace and extending the set of allocated shared regions.
We define separating conjunction P ∗ P ′ = {(n,A,H ) | ∃H1,H2. H = H1 + H2 ∧ (n,A,H1) ∈
P ∧ (n,A,H2) ∈ P
′}. ⊛i ∈I Pi = Pi1 ∗ · · · ∗ Pin , where I = {i1, . . . , in} is a finite index set, denotes
iterated separating conjunction. We define I = {(n,A,H ) | I ∈ A} and ⊲P = {(n,A,H ) | ∀n′ <
n. (n′,A,H ) ∈ P}. We define True = {(n,A,H ) | true}.
As in §3.2, we define postconditions as functions from result values to assertions.
We define the ghost heaps д ∈ GhostHeaps = GhostLocs ⇀fin GhostVals as the finite partial
functions from ghost locations to ghost values.
We define the precedence relation as follows, where A,A′ ⊆ Invs range over finite sets of allo-
cated shared region invariants:
P ⊑ P ′ = ∀(n,A,H ) ∈ P,Hinv ∈ ⊛I ∈A I ,Henv,V ,h, ρ,д. H +Hinv +Henv ≤ V + h + ρ + д ⇒
∃V ′,H ′,A′ ⊇ A,H ′inv ∈ ⊛I ∈A′ I ,д
′. TracesN (V
′) ⊆ TracesN (V )
∧ H ′ +H ′inv +Henv ≤ V
′
+ h + ρ + д′ ∧ (n,A′,H ′) ∈ P ′
We define the weakest precondition wp(e,Q) ∈ Asns of an expression with respect to a postcon-
dition Q as follows:
wp(e,Q) = {(n,A,H ) | (∀v . e = v ⇒ (n,A,H ) ∈ Q(v)) ∧ ∀n′ < n,T ,V ,h,д, ρ,Hinv,Henv.
TracesN (V ) ⊆ T ∧Hinv ∈ ⊛I ∈A I ∧H + Hinv +Henv ≤ V + h + д + ρ ⇒
¬failed(T ,h, ρ, e) ∧ ∀T ′,h′, ρ ′, e ′, e f .
T ,h, ρ, e ֒→ T ′,h′, ρ ′, e ′, e f ⇒ ∃H
′,H ′inv,V
′,д′,A′ ⊇ A.
TracesN (V
′) ⊆ T ′ ∧H ′inv ∈ ⊛I ∈A′ I ∧H
′
+ H ′inv +Henv ≤ V
′
+ h′ + ρ ′ + д′
∧ (n′,A′,H ′) ∈ wp(e ′,Q) ∗⊛e ′′∈e wp(e
′′, True)}
We define {P} e {Q} = (P ⊆ wp(e,Q)). We can derive both the Hoare rules from Fig. 2 and the
new ones in Fig. 4.
We have adequacy:
Theorem7.2. If {(n,A,H ) |V ≤ H } ⊆ wp(e, True) then ∀T ,h, ρ. TracesN (V ) ⊆ T ⇒ safe((T ,h, ρ, e)).
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{P} e {True}
{P} fork(e) {True}
{I ∗ P} !ℓ {I ∗Q}
{ I ∗ P} 〈!ℓ〉 { I ∗Q}
vold ∈ DataVals {I ∗ P} if !ℓ = vold then ℓ ← vnew; true else false {I ∗Q}
{ I ∗ P} CAS(ℓ,vold,vnew) { I ∗Q}
I ⊑ I
True ⊑ ∃ℓˆ. ℓˆ 7→ vˆ
Fig. 4. Proof rules of the concurrent Hoare logic
function newChannel() {
let pvar := create_pvar() in
let queue := ref ϵ in
return {pvar := pvar; queue := queue}
}
function send(c,v) {
let elems := 〈!c .queue〉 in
if ¬CAS(c .queue, elems, elems · v) then
send(c,v)
}
function receive(c) {
let elems := 〈!c .queue〉 in
mat elemswith
| ϵ ⇒ return receive(c)
| v ·v ⇒
if CAS(c .queue, elems,v) then {
assign_pvar(c .pvar,v); return v
} else
return receive(c)
}
Fig. 5. An implementation of the channels specifications. (We use ML-like structure notation as syntactic
sugar for pair construction and destruction.)
8 VERIFYING A CHANNEL IMPLEMENTATION USING PROPHECY VARIABLES
Consider an implementation in Fig. 5 of the channels specification introduced above. While this
is not a very realistic implementation (for example, it performs busy waiting), it is sufficient to
illustrate our proposed approach of using prophecy variables to achieve I/O-style specifications
for in-memory data structures. The proof strategy is as follows. To allow the channel’s queue to
be accessed concurrently by multiple threads, we insert it into a shared region at channel creation
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time, whose invariant is as follows:
inv(c, ℓˆS1, ℓˆS2, ℓˆR) = ∃v, µ1, µ2,M . c .queue 7→ v ∗ ℓˆS1
1/2
7→ µ1 ∗ ℓˆS2
1/2
7→ µ2 ∗ ℓˆR
1/2
7→ M
∧ ∀µ ′ ∈ µ1 | | µ2. v · µ
′ ∈ M
It asserts full ownership of the queue, as well as fractional ownership (with fraction one half) of
three ghost cells whose values track the state of the three threads using the channel. Furthermore,
it asserts the consistency of the threads’ states and the contents of the queue: these contents,
followed by any interleaving of the sequences yet to be sent by the sender threads, satisfy the
receiver thread’s current prophecy variable constraint.
Predicates sender and receiver describe the resources and information held by the three threads:
sender(c, µ) = ∃ℓˆS, ℓˆS1, ℓˆS2, ℓˆR. inv(c, ℓˆS1, ℓˆS2, ℓˆR) ∧ ℓˆS
1/2
7→ µ ∧ ℓˆS ∈ {ℓˆS1, ℓˆS2}
receiver(c, µ) = ∃ℓˆS1, ℓˆS2, ℓˆR,M . inv(c, ℓˆS1, ℓˆS2, ℓˆR)
∧ cpvar(c .pvar,M , µ) ∗ ℓˆR
1/2
7→ M
Notice that each thread owns a one-half fraction of the ghost cell tracking its state.
Owning just a fraction of a ghost cell does not allow a thread to mutate it; the following law
allows a thread that performs an atomic operation to do so after matching up its fraction with the
one held in the shared invariant:
ℓˆ
1/2
7→ v1 ∗ ℓˆ
1/2
7→ v2 ⇔ ℓˆ 7→ v1 ∧ v2 = v1
We can now straightforwardly define the send_ and receive_ transition predicates:
send_(p, c, µ) = p ⊑ sender(c, µ)
receive_(p, c, µ) = p ⊑ receiver(c, µ)
Given these definitions, the proof of the channel implementation is straightforward.
We have developed a machine-checked proof that the chat server example and the channels im-
plementation satisfy the specifications shown here by applying Iris to a programming language in-
strumented with I/O and prophecy variables as described in this paper [Timany and Jacobs 2019].
We have also encoded the approach into the logic of the VeriFast program verifier for C and
verified C versions of the buffered I/O and chat server examples using VeriFast; see the exam-
ples/abstract_io directory in the VeriFast 18.02 distribution [Jacobs 2018]. In this development, the
constrained incremental prophecy variables are introduced as trusted primitives.
9 RELATEDWORK
Penninckx et al. [Penninckx et al. 2015] originally proposed to use an embedding of Petri nets in
separation logic to specify and verify I/O properties of programs in a way that is modular and
compositional. The present paper builds on this work.
Besides [Penninckx et al. 2015], we are not aware of existing work that addresses the question
of what specifications to use for platform I/O APIs, and for the program as a whole, such that a
Hoare logic proof of the program’s behavioral properties can be carried out modularly.
The idea of prophecy variables has been known for a long time; it was originally proposed
by Abadi and Lamport [Abadi and Lamport 1991]. However, little work has appeared so far on
formalizing its use in Hoare logics. Vafeiadis used it in his PhD thesis [Vafeiadis 2007], but he did
not formalize this aspect of his logic.
Zhang et al. [Zhang et al. 2012] have formalized a form of structural prophecy variables. How-
ever, their form of prophecy variables does not appear to be suitable for implementing data struc-
tures with I/O-stype specifications. or example, it cannot be used to verify our chat server example.
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10 CONCLUSION
We propose an approach for assigning Hoare logic specifications to the I/O APIs of programming
platforms, as well as to programs themselves, that allows the I/O behavior of these programs to
be verified in a modular, compositional, and abstract manner. Compared to the existing work on
which we build, we enable true I/O actions to be mixed in specifications transparently with ac-
tions that are implemented in-memory. We propose the use of constrained, incremental prophecy
variables to allow nondeterministic in-memory operations to be specified like I/O input actions.
Furthermore, we enable a greater degree of equivalence reasoning on specifications.
We have machine-checked the theory and the example proofs of the paper using the Iris library
in the Coq proof assistant.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 I/O verification with Iris
By instantiating the Iris program logic for our monitoring I/O semantics, we can use Iris’ Hoare
logic to verify programs that perform I/O.
In general, when using Iris to verify a program written in a programming language whose state
space is S , ranged over by s , the assertions of the proof refer to the program state by directly or
indirectly asserting fragmentary ownership of a ghost cell allocated at some well-known ghost cell
address, say γSTATE. For example, consider the Hoare triple below, which expresses that program
foo takes program state s0 to program state s1:
{ ◦s0
γSTATE } foo { ◦s1
γSTATE }
The state space of our instrumented semantics consists of the states σ of the original program-
ming language (let’s call these heaps), and I/O states T . For convenience, we will track these using
separate ghost cells γHEAP and γIO.
For example, assume putchar ∈ T is a primitive I/O tag. Then hi = putchar(’h’); putchar(’i’)
is a program, that satisfies specification T = {τ | τ  putchar(’h’, ()); putchar(’i’, ())}, where 
is prefixing: τ  τ · τ ′. We can express this in Iris as:
{ ◦T
γIO
} hi { ◦{ϵ}
γIO
}
This correctness judgment can be verified in Iris, using the following Hoare triple for primitive
I/O commands:
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∃v ′. t(v,v ′) ∈ T
{ ◦T
γIO
} t(v) {v ′. ◦{τ | t(v,v ′) · τ ∈ T }
γIO
}
Note: we also have ◦∅
γIO
⇒ False.
(These specifications additionally express that the expressions do not access the heap.)
We can build the Petri nets-based logic from Sec. 3 on top of this basic logic, inside Iris, as follows.
We introduce a ghost cell γPETRI that tracks the Petri net and the marking, and an invariant that
links it to γIO:
◦tracesN (V )
γIO
⇛
∃V ,T . ◦T
γIO
∗ •(N ,V )
γPETRI
∧ tracesN (V ) ⊆ T ∗ ◦(N ,V )
γPETRI
Furthermore, we allow splitting of markings:
◦(N ,V1 ⊎V2)
γPETRI
⇔ ◦(N ,V1)
γPETRI
∗ ◦(N ,V2)
γPETRI
This way, we can define the primitive predicates of Sec. 3 as follows:
token(p) = ◦(_, {[p]})
γPETRI
t_(p,v,v ′,q) = ∃N . ◦(N , 0)
γPETRI
∧ t(p,v,v ′,q) ∈ N
We now wish to establish the following proof rule for primitive I/O commands:
{token(p) ∧ t_(p,v,v ′,q)} t(v) {v ′′. v ′′ = v ′ ∧ token(q)}
However, this proof rule is sound only if the Petri net is result-deterministic, by which we mean
that if {τ · t(v,v ′), τ · t(v,v ′′)} ⊆ tracesN (V ), then v
′′
= v ′. We will therefore assume the Petri
net is result-deterministic. (Furthermore, we extend the invariant above with a conjunct saying
thatT is result-deterministic.) However, using a single result-deterministic Petri net as a program
specification precludes underspecifying the environment. We will therefore use as a program spec-
ification not a single Petri net, but a set of result-deterministic Petri nets. More specifically, we will
verify the program not against a single Petri net, but against all Petri nets from some set. We are
in fact applying the following law, where T is a set of sets of traces:
(∀T ∈ T. e  T ) ⇒ e 
⋃
T
For example, in the toUpper example from Sec. 3 the program is verified against 26 distinct Petri
nets, each of which determines the result of the getchar command differently.
